The Trade-Off of Benefits in International Cooperation: Which Takes Priority, Absolute Benefits or Relative Benefits?

Lian Li

doi:10.6918/IJOSSER.202603_9(3).0006

Authors

Lian Li

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.6918/IJOSSER.202603_9(3).0006

Keywords:

National cooperation, Absolute return, Relative return

Abstract

The driving force of international cooperation lies in the fact that participating countries can obtain the expected benefits. The final decision of a country to participate is the result of a comprehensive weighing of absolute and relative benefits. This article aims to explore under what circumstances international cooperation between countries will prioritize absolute benefits? And under what circumstances will concerns about relative benefits outweigh the willingness to cooperate? This "priority" issue is not static and absolute; it is a weighing process that depends on the nature of the cooperation field and the nature of the relationship between countries. This article attempts to use variables such as the nature of the issue area (such as economy, security) and the nature of the relationship between countries (such as ally, partner, or competitive relationship) as variables, and through case analysis, to demonstrate that in cooperation in the economic and security fields with partnerships, countries are more likely to prioritize absolute benefits; in cooperation in the security and economic fields with competitive relationships, considerations of relative benefits will take precedence.

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